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Program
Rooms
(1st floor): Procter & Gamble, Nancy et Michel-Gaucher,
and Van Houtte.
Email facilities: Hewitt, and Antony-Rizzuto.
Monday May 28, 2007 | |
8:00 - 8:45 |
Registration (room Procter & Gamble) |
8:45 - 9:00 |
Welcome address |
9:00 - 10:00 |
Plenary I - Chair
Georges Zaccour (room Procter & Gamble) |
10:00 - 10:30 |
Coffee break |
10:30 - 12:00 |
Parallel Sessions
Spatially Differentiated Trade of
Permits for Multipollutant Electric Power Supply Chains
Negotiating the initial permits
allocation as a revelation mechanism in non point source pollution
The air pollution emission permits
market and moral hazard |
Energy Capital Certificates: making
stakeholder participation in wind industry a reality
Which Game for the NAFTA Institutions to
Finance Shared Pollution Abatement?
How to Improve Game Models by
Considering Different Solution Concepts: Case of an Interconnected
Hydro-Conflict |
|
12:00 - 14:00 |
Lunch |
14:00 - 15:30 |
Tutorial I - Chair Lina Mallozzi
(room Procter & Gamble) |
15:30 - 16:00 |
Coffee break |
16:00 - 17:30 |
Parallel Sessions
Technological Deployment and Carbon
Tradable Permits: What does Game Theory Add?
Emission Trading among Asymmetric
Players of Self-Enforcing International Agreement
Green Auctions: A study of Mechanism
Design with Externalities |
Short-run stick, long-run carrot : the
role of initial conditions
Public Infrastructure, Strategic
Interactions and Endogenous Growth
Sustainable Growth in a Two-Country
Trade Model under Different Property Rights Regimes for Natural
Resources |
Tuesday May 29, 2007 | |
9:00 - 10:00 |
Plenary II - Chair
Michèle Breton (room Procter & Gamble) |
10:00 - 10:30 |
Coffee break |
10:30 - 12:00 |
Parallel Sessions
Learning and the great fish war: Between
cooperative and non cooperative resource management
A Semi-Markov Game Model of a Deep-Sea
Fishery
A game-theoretic approach to water
quality management |
A Game Theoretic Approach to Emergency
Units Location Problem
Point Resource Dependence, Trust and
Conflict
Partial Cooperation and Non-signatories
Multiple Decision |
|
12:00 - 14:00 |
Lunch |
14:00 - 15:30 |
Tutorial II - Chair Guiomar Martín-Herrán
(room Procter & Gamble) |
15:30 - 16:00 |
Coffee break |
16:00 - 17:30 |
Parallel Sessions
Sharing a migratory fish stock:
cooperative and non cooperative strategies
The Unregulated Fishing Problem in the
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
Policies for the Game of Global Marine
Invasive Species Pollution |
Environmental Taxation and Vertical
Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries matter
Strategic Quality Competition and the
Porter Hypothesis
Dynamic Oligopoly Competition with
Public Environmental Information Disclosure |
Wednesday May 30, 2007 | |
9:00 - 10:00 |
Plenary III - Chair Fioravante
Patrone (room Procter & Gamble) |
10:00 - 10:30 |
Coffee break |
10:30 - 12:00 |
Parallel Sessions
Free-riding and cooperation in
environmental games
Dynamic models for international
environmental agreements
An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for
Coalition Games with Externalities |
Strong Nash equilibrium in a repeated
enveronmental engineering game with stochastic dynamic.
Nash equilibria in unconstrained
stochastic games of resource extraction
Belief-distorted Nash equilibria for
various forms of beliefs |
|
12:00 - 14:00 |
Lunch |
14:00 - 15:30 |
Parallel Sessions
Simulations of Dynamic Games Involving
Restoration of Natural Systems among Agricultural Systems: an
Application to the Sacramento River
Managing correlated stock externalities
: water taxes with a pinch of salt
The fisheries management of straddling
stocks in the Patagonian large marine ecosystem: economic aspects |
A legal analysis of the Convention on
the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea and its
capacity to ensure environmental protection from ship-based pollution
Stackelberg Differential Games and
Queueing Process to Environmental Pollution Economics and Control
Gas markets, access regimes and
investments incentives |
|
15:30 - 16:00 |
Coffee break |
16:00 - 17:30 |
Tutorial III - Chair
Francisco
Cabo (room Procter & Gamble) |