Presentation on YouTube.

In the realm of game theory, strategic interactions pervade every facet of decision-making, from economics and political science to biology and computer science. These interactions, often characterized by uncertainty, have fueled the development of various game models to capture the subtleties of real-world scenarios. Among these models, interval games emerge as a powerful framework for addressing the inherent uncertainty and vagueness inherent in decision-making processes.

This paper deals with the intersection of noncooperative and cooperative interval games, offering novel insights into strategic interactions under uncertainty by introducing the interval α and β characteristic functions (CFs). We consider noncooperative two-player non-zero-sum interval games played between a coalition and players that are left out of the coalition and determine the interval α and β CFs for each coalition. Further, we compute the interval Shapley value and the interval core in the context of cooperative interval games and provide some numerical illustrations.

Bio: I’m a postdoctoral fellow at HEC- Montreal, supervised by Georges Zaccour, Michèle Breton and Olivier Bahn. I have worked in the Economics department as an Assistant Professor at Canakkale Onsekiz Mart University in Turkey for three years. I received my Ph.D. in mathematics at the same university. I am broadly interested in deterministic dynamic games (multistage games), noncooperative games, cooperative games, and their applications to economics, particularly cooperative interval games, which are the generalization of classical cooperative games.