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Séminaire sur les jeux dynamiques et les applications
A Stackelberg game approach to evaluate the effectiveness of cap-and-trade regulation under disruption
Mohammad Yavari – Professeur visiteur, École de technologie supérieure, Canada
Séminaire en format hybride au GERAD local 4488 ou Zoom
This study explores the impact of cap-and-trade regulations on the performance of dual-channel green supply chains in the presence of disruptions. It examines the interplay between pricing and greening strategies under cap-and-trade conditions and varying market demand disruptions. The model employs a Stackelberg game framework involving an eco-friendly product manufacturer and a retailer, applicable to centralized and decentralized systems. Results show that a dynamic cap-and-trade system can provide the needed flexibility to adjust emission allowances in real time, and dynamic regulatory frameworks should be supported to balance emission management with supply chain profitability.
Georges Zaccour
responsable
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Activité hybride au GERAD
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Pavillon André-Aisenstadt
Campus de l'Université de Montréal
2920, chemin de la Tour
Montréal Québec H3T 1J4
Canada
Pavillon André-Aisenstadt
Campus de l'Université de Montréal
2920, chemin de la Tour
Montréal Québec H3T 1J4
Canada