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Séminaire sur les jeux dynamiques et les applications

Mitigation, Adaptation and Cooperation in Response to Climate Disaster

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20 fév. 2025   11h00 — 12h00

Simon Elgersma University of Groningen, Pays-Bas

Simon Elgersma

Séminaire hybride au GERAD ou Zoom

We consider the tradeoff between mitigation and adaptation in a transboundary pollution game with an environmental regime shift. Countries can lower their emissions to decrease the likelihood that a regime shift takes place or proactively invest in adaptive capital to reduce the impact of the regime shift. We solve for the social planner outcome and the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) and study how the option to adapt affects incentives to mitigate, precautionary behavior and welfare. In the social planner outcome, adaptation complements mitigation and increases welfare, but in the non-cooperative outcome adaptation crowds out mitigation and lowers welfare. Finally, we introduce efficient procedures to numerically calculate MPNE in differential games that cannot be solved analytically.

Georges Zaccour responsable

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Activité hybride au GERAD
Zoom et salle 4488
Pavillon André-Aisenstadt
Campus de l'Université de Montréal
2920, chemin de la Tour

Montréal Québec H3T 1J4
Canada

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