G-2006-82
Credible Linear-Incentive Equilibrium Strategies in Linear-Quadratic Differential Games
et référence BibTeX
We characterize in this paper the credibility of linear-incentive equilibrium strategies for the class of linear-quadratic differential games. This class is widely used in applications of differential games in economics and management science. We derive a general condition for credibility and illustrate its use on two examples, one is a general homogenous linear-quadratic game and the second is an environmental-economics game.
Paru en décembre 2006 , 35 pages
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Publication
jan. 2009
Credible linear incentive equilibrium strategies in linear-quadratic differential games
et
Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, 10, 261–291, 2009
référence BibTeX