G-2007-34
Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium Strategies when the Private Label Competes with the National Brand
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We consider a noncooperative differential game where a retailer sells her own private label in addition to the manufacturer’s brand. We assume that each brand’s goodwill evolves according to a modified Nerlove-Arrow dynamic, in such a way that the advertising effort of one brand hurts the competitor’s goodwill stock. We characterize Feedback-Stackelberg pricing and advertising strategies and employ simulations to analyze their sensitivity to the main model parameters.
Paru en mai 2007 , 24 pages
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jan. 2008
Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium strategies when the private label competes with the national brand
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Annals of Operations Research, 164(1), 79–95, 2008
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