In an electricity system under market-based regulation, participants have the opportunity to trade electricity both through forward contracts and on the spot market. We model the interaction between these markets and focus on how the information available in each market affects the market equilibrium. We present results for Ontario.

A computable stochastic dynamic game model will be presented. The stochastic structure of the game is represented by an event tree, with uncontrolled probability measure. The concept of S-adapted equilibrium is used to represent the possibility for the players to use Nash equilibrium strategies that are dynamically adapted to the scenarios represented in the event tree. The model is used to represent the possible competition in international market for carbon emissions permits. The model includes a representation of the uncertainty concerning the participation of developing countries, and the United States, in international efforts to curb GHG emissions and in the markets for tradable permits.

We analyze burden sharing for 15 world-regions under global GHG abatement scenarios. The World-MARKAL model is used to determine the cost-effective opportunities and to compute the gross abatement costs (before permit exchanges) for each region. Permit exchanges are based on equitable allocation schemes derived from a dynamic multicriterion model. The regional net costs (burdens) are discussed.