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Session MB1 - Théorie des jeux II / Game Theory II

Day Monday, May 04, 2009
Room St-Hubert
President Peter Kort

Presentations

03h30 PM-
03h55 PM
Competition Between Two Ports: An Application of Cooperative Game Among Container Terminals of One Port
  Naima Saeed, Molde University College, Economics, Molde University College, Postbox: 2110, 6402 Molde, NORWAY, Molde, Norway, 6402
Odd I Larsen, Molde University College, Economics, Molde University College, Postbox: 2110, 6402 Molde, NORWAY, Molde, Norway, 6402

In this paper two-stage game played by three container terminals is discussed. In the first stage of the game, all terminals are playing a non-cooperative game, which is solved with the help of Bertrand model. In the second stage of the game, three partial and one grand coalition are investigated on the basis of characteristic function and core.


03h55 PM-
04h20 PM
Policy Making when Models Disagree
  Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, HEC Montréal, Canada
Pauline Barrieu, London School of Economics, Statistics, London, United Kingdom

We propose a general way to craft public policy when there is no consensual account of the situation of interest. The design does not require a representative policymaker's utility function (as in the literature on ambiguity), a reference model (as in robust control) or a probability distribution over the set of supplied scenarios (as in Bayesian model-averaging approaches).


04h20 PM-
04h45 PM
Open or Closed Source with a Complementary Product
  Peter Kort, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Georges Zaccour, GERAD, HEC Montréal, Marketing, 3000, chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal, Québec, Canada, H3T 2A7

The decision to open the source code of a software product has advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantage is that the firm loses revenue and competitors can benefit from knowing the source code. The advantage is that the users' network can contribute to the quality of the software code and thus also to the quality of the complementary product.


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