Journées de l'optimisation 2009 Optimizations days

Hydro-Québec has to sell first in Quebec, at cost of service. Its opportunity cost is the unrealized profit in higher cost jurisdictions, subject to transmission constraints. Although transmission capacity is sometimes tight in North America, it is not always fully utilized. This paper investigates the value of non-utilized transmission capacity from Quebec to its deregulated neighbours.

Electricity markets across jurisdictions greatly vary. Integrating such different markets can lead to significant, but unevenly distributed, welfare improvements, even without including environmental gains. Therefore, integration could be opposed by some. Furthermore environmental impacts are not necessarily positive. This paper considers two jurisdictions and compares different institutional frameworks. We propose a detailed numerical illustration of the Ontario and Quebec market.

In this paper, we model a ten-period electricity market with interdependent demand, where oligopolistic generators make investments in peak- and base-load capacities. We mainly focus on capacity investment incentives as demand for electricity evolves over time. The model is calibrated with Ontario data. Two equilibrium scenarios are proposed: symmetric and asymmetric equilibrium.

Facing a surge in both global energy prices and internal electricity demands, China must improve the economic and environmental efficiencies of its coal powerplants. Said efficiencies between US states and Chinese provinces are compared using a self-written, Cplex based program. Variables are fuel utilisation rates, employment numbers, CO2 emission rates and amount of electricity generated.