Status Concern and Environmental Awareness in a Common Access Resource Game with Heterogeneous Agents
Jesús Marín Solano – Universitat de Barcelona, Espagne
In an international context, countries and firms are concerned not only with their consumption/extraction levels of a natural resource. They may also consider their relative position compared to other actors. To understand these consequences, previous work in the literature has studied how agents with status concern (such as e.g., output-based and profit-based status) extract or transform a common pool renewable resource. In this paper, we also introduce the possibility that one (or both) agents care about the quantity of the natural resource. This could be the result of several facts. First, the agents might value the own existence of the resource, for ecological or reputational reasons (environmental awareness). Alternatively, a country could benefit economically (e.g. through tourism) from the existence of the resource. Finally, we examine the effects of asymmetries between agents. (With Carles Mañó-Cabello and Jorge Navas)
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